The Iraqi constitution of 2005 establishes a parliamentary democracy characterized by collaboration and equilibrium between legislative and executive authorities. In this regard, the ministerial program carries constitutional weight since the Prime Minister-designate is required to present it to the House of Representatives in the course of gaining parliamentary confidence. After its approval, the ministerial program is to be regarded as a political and constitutional basis for the future conduct of the government and its evaluation for adherence before Parliament and other regulatory bodies. This paper focuses on the position of the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court regarding the ministerial program in light of whether constitutional judicial oversight can cover the existence, content, and application of the latter. The analytical-legal research method was employed to examine Articles 47, 76, and 93 of the Iraqi Constitution of 2005 as well as legislation, parliamentary procedures, and court judgments. According to the findings, the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court does not conduct any direct judicial oversight concerning the ministerial program as an independent political act. Nevertheless, indirect judicial oversight can take place with respect to the establishment of the government, the doctrine of the separation of power, financial pressure on the executive authority, and decisions/procedures taken by federal bodies while implementing the ministerial program. This paper concludes that the decisions made by the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court outline the constitutional boundaries of the ministerial program.
The Iraqi constitution of 2005 establishes a parliamentary democracy characterized by collaboration and equilibrium between legislative and executive authorities. In this regard, the ministerial program carries constitutional weight since the Prime Minister-designate is required to present it to the House of Representatives in the course of gaining parliamentary confidence. After its approval, the ministerial program is to be regarded as a political and constitutional basis for the future conduct of the government and its evaluation for adherence before Parliament and other regulatory bodies. This paper focuses on the position of the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court regarding the ministerial program in light of whether constitutional judicial oversight can cover the existence, content, and application of the latter. The analytical-legal research method was employed to examine Articles 47, 76, and 93 of the Iraqi Constitution of 2005 as well as legislation, parliamentary procedures, and court judgments. According to the findings, the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court does not conduct any direct judicial oversight concerning the ministerial program as an independent political act. Nevertheless, indirect judicial oversight can take place with respect to the establishment of the government, the doctrine of the separation of power, financial pressure on the executive authority, and decisions/procedures taken by federal bodies while implementing the ministerial program. This paper concludes that the decisions made by the Iraqi Federal Supreme Court outline the constitutional boundaries of the ministerial program.
