

Received: 21 June, 2026

Accepted: 09 September, 2026

Published: 30 September, 2026

What a Boundary Does: Parergon and the Unity of Kant's Critical System – O que faz um limite: Parergon e a unidade do sistema crítico de Kant

Zeynep Münteha Kot
Istanbul University, Türkiye;
zeynep.kottan@istanbul.edu.tr

Abdullah Demir
Iğdır University, Türkiye

Cite this article:

Kot, Z. M., and Demir, A. (2026). What a Boundary Does: Parergon and the Unity of Kant's Critical System. *Revista Cultura Científica*, (24), pp. 1585–1597. <https://doi.org/10.70517/revcc2624130>

Abstract

Kant's critical system establishes distinct domains of authority through the distinctions between *Erscheinung/Noumenon*, *Sinnlichkeit/Verstand*, *konstitutiv/regulativ*, and the *theoretischer/praktischer Gebrauch der Vernunft*. Yet the fact that freedom, excluded from theoretical cognition, acquires a necessary status in practical reason, that the concept of the *Noumenon* marks the limits of phenomenal cognition without itself becoming an object of cognition, and that the *Ideen der Vernunft* retain their regulative function without acquiring constitutive validity shows that the critical boundary cannot be understood as a simple distinction between inside and outside. Rather than reassessing the relation between the *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* and the *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* within the binary of continuity and rupture, this study therefore turns to a question that precedes this debate: How does the critical boundary operate? The central thesis of the article is that, in Kant, the boundary is not a negative line separating already constituted domains, but a relational structure that determines their *Gebrauch*, *Gültigkeit*, and authority. This

structure is examined by reading the concept of *parergon* in §14 of the *Kritik der Urteilkraft* alongside theories of representation concerned with the transformation of *parergon* into *ergon* in the pictorial genre of still life. This reading shows that the status of an element is not intrinsic to it; it can change according to the relational order within which it operates. When the same model is applied to the critical system, limitation is understood not as exclusion but as a distribution of authority: what changes is not the concept itself, but the function and validity accorded to it within a particular *Gebrauch der Vernunft*. The systematic unity of the Critiques is thus grounded not in overcoming their distinctions, but in ordering the different uses of the same *Vernunft* without reducing one to another. In this study, *parergon* is therefore proposed not as a metaphor for Kant's system, but as a structural model for interpreting the critical boundary—one that preserves distinction while making relation possible.

Keywords: Kant, *parergon*, critical boundary, theoretical and practical reason, systematic unity

1. INTRODUCTION

Kant's critical philosophy is built upon boundaries. The answers to what we can know, what we may hope, and what we ought to do proceed by drawing a series of boundaries: appearance is distinguished from noumenon, sensibility from understanding, constitutive use from regulative use, and theoretical reason from practical reason; each is determined as much by what it is not as by what it is. Yet the real difficulty lies not on either side of the distinction, but in the boundary between them. For the boundaries Kant draws do not simply close off one domain while excluding the other. Freedom, which theoretical reason cannot know, becomes necessary in practical reason; the noumenon, without being an object of cognition, determines the limits of phenomenal cognition; and the ideas of reason, although incapable of constituting objects, retain their function with respect to systematic unity. We must therefore ask: Does the boundary merely indicate where we must stop, or does it also determine what the domains it separates can be? This question also shifts the debate over continuity and rupture—whether the Second Critique is a continuation or a revision of the First Critique—onto different ground. The issue is no longer whether the boundary is crossed, but how the boundary operates. To begin with, theoretical and practical reason are identified as different uses of the same *Vernunft*. Yet this identification immediately gives rise to further problems. First, we must ask: If theoretical and practical uses belong to the same *Vernunft*, where exactly does this unity lie? Does unity consist merely in the identity of the subject, or is there a more fundamental principle of reason governing both uses? Second, we must ask how the same reason can legitimate in one use what is not legitimate in another. If the two uses of the same *Vernunft* are not independent of one another, how can the claims of one coexist with those of the other without conflict? Theoretical reason cannot know freedom; practical reason, however, does not merely presuppose freedom but requires it as a condition of the moral law. If theoretical and practical use belong to the same faculty, the boundary between them cannot be an external line separating two independent regions. The boundary then becomes an internal operation of differentiation that determines what the same *Vernunft* can do and under what conditions. These questions, all revolving around the same center, recur in Kant's Third Critique in the context of art and in a more elementary form: How can a frame that does not belong to a painting participate in the determination of that painting?

Kant calls the frame, the drapery on a statue, and the colonnades surrounding a building *parerga*. They are not the work itself (*Werk selbst*); yet they participate in its determination: they are not the painting, but they indicate where the painting ends. They are outside, but they participate in how what is inside appears. In fact, *parergon* is neither a cryptic concept that explains the transcendental system nor a newly introduced category. This study uses *parergon* as a model for examining how the boundary operates. To this end, analyses developed within modern theories of representation concerning the frame, center, periphery, and representational status are incorporated into the article. Stoichita's account of the transformation of still life from *parergon* into *ergon*, Alpers's dissolution of the *istoria*-centered order of representation, and Bryson's distinction between *megalography* and *rhopography* all pose the same question through different configurations of representation: Is it really the thing itself that makes it center or periphery?

Rather than adding yet another answer to the already existing responses to the question "Is there continuity or rupture between the Critiques?", this article problematizes the boundary problem underlying the entire debate through the relation between frame (*parergon*) and work (*ergon*), proceeding from the following premises: Critical distinctions are established not between isolated terms, but between uses that are subject to different conditions of authority and validity within the same conceptual order. The position of an element should therefore be understood not as an immutable property belonging to it, but in relation to the order within which it operates. Such an approach does not weaken distinctions; on the contrary, it attempts to explain the conditions under which they can be established and sustained. For a system is a system because it has boundaries. Yet if the boundary is conceived as a wall, important movements within Kant's critical architecture cannot be explained. The different status of freedom in theoretical and practical use is the clearest example. What changes is not the concept, but the authority accorded to it. The same can be observed in the field of representation: an object that functions as *parergon* in one composition can become *ergon* in another representational order. The aim of this study is not to establish a historical relation of influence between Kant and modern theories of representation, but to arrive at an answer to a more fundamental question: How can a boundary determine the very things it separates? What is required, therefore, is to seek the unity of the critical system not in overcoming distinctions, but in their systematic ordering. Indeed, Kant's claim to systematic unity itself provides a basis that does not allow the Critiques to be read independently of one another.

2. THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE CRITICAL BOUNDARY

The Aristotelian tradition, followed by many Islamic philosophers, most notably al-Farabi and Avicenna, as well as Latin scholastics such as Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, classified the sciences according to their subject matter. Within this organization, the domain of knowledge was divided into theoretical (*theoria*), practical (*praxis*), and productive (*poiesis*) disciplines. The theoretical sciences comprised physics, mathematics, and metaphysics; the practical sciences comprised ethics, politics, and economics; and the productive sciences comprised the arts and crafts. Approximately two millennia after Aristotle, when Immanuel Kant wrote what may be regarded as one of the foundational texts of modern

moral philosophy, the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (*Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten*, 1785), this classification was relocated onto a ground defined by the *a priori* and *a posteriori* use of reason. In the Preface, Kant notes that the ancient Greek division was based on subject matter. According to Kant, however, these disciplines—physics, ethics, and logic—must be considered not in terms of their objects, but in terms of the principles on which they rest; only in this way can the division be secured. “Principle,” in turn, is used here not in its most general sense, but in the sense of the fundamental source from which cognition is derived. The source of empirical principles is experience (*Erfahrung*), whereas that of *a priori* principles is reason (*Vernunft*). Accordingly, the sciences are divided into those concerned with objects (material) and those that are not (formal). While logic is entirely *a priori*, physics and ethics contain both empirical and *a priori* parts [1, AA 4:387–388]. The distinction maintained between empirical and *a priori* principles is not merely pedagogical; it constitutes the methodological backbone of Kant’s critical philosophy. Indeed, in the *Critique of Practical Reason* (*Kritik der praktischen Vernunft*, 1788), Kant investigates the *a priori* principles of practical reason insofar as it determines the will, while in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (*Kritik der Urteilskraft*, 1790), he investigates the *a priori* principles of aesthetic and teleological judgment. As formulated in the First Critique, the questions that guide the critical project are: (a) What can I know? (b) What ought I to do? and (c) What may I hope? Tracing the transcendental principles through which these boundaries are established also makes it possible to understand why their construction is decisive for the grounding of practical reason.

“What can I know?” (*Was kann ich wissen?*) offers, at the point where it appears in the First Critique, one of the most concentrated formulations of Kant’s project. At the end of the work, Kant gathers the concerns of reason under three questions, the first of which asks precisely what can be known [2, A805/B833]. Read retrospectively, this question also condenses the critical task carried out throughout the work: reason must determine both the extent of its legitimate cognition and the limits beyond which cognition cannot proceed. Kant accordingly describes critique as establishing the boundaries of the domain in which pure reason can legitimately exercise its cognitive claims [2, A761/B789; A795/B823]. If we retrace the steps leading to this conclusion, following the transcendental guideline in reverse, the elements, conditions, scope, and limits of cognition become clear. The question first develops into an inquiry into the possibility of *a priori* cognition. Kant introduces this problem at the very beginning of the *Introduction*, distinguishing cognition that arises independently of experience from cognition whose sources are empirical [2, B1–2]. The two features that characterize *a priori* cognition—in other words, that distinguish it from *a posteriori* cognition—are necessity (*Notwendigkeit*) and strict universality (*strenge Allgemeinheit*) [2, B3–4]. Experience can show us a cognition as universal, but not as necessary and strictly universal. Such cognitions possess not strict but merely empirical or comparative universality (*komparative Allgemeinheit*), since they remain open to the possibility of exceptions. Mathematical propositions, by contrast, provide Kant with clear examples of propositions possessing necessity and strict universality [2, B4–5]. The domain and conditions of the cognition that pure reason produces independently of experience must therefore be investigated.

This interim answer to the question of what pure reason can know is, first, a response to Hume. In the *Prolegomena*, Kant generalizes and systematizes the objection of Hume, who, as he famously states, awakened him from his “dogmatic slumber” [3, AA 4:260]. The two philosophers agree that the concept of causality cannot be derived from experience [4, Sections IV and VII], but they diverge over the source of the concept. For Hume, the source of causality lies in psychological habit, whereas for Kant it lies in the *a priori* structure of the understanding (*Verstand*). To elaborate on this difference, the fact that experience cannot provide necessity does not mean that necessity does not exist. Indeed, the category of causality is necessary for the objective and orderly constitution of experience. This interim answer to the question of what pure reason can know is, second, directed toward the history of philosophy by shifting the orientation of the inquiry from object to subject. What is now investigated is no longer what objects are in themselves, but the conditions of possibility under which they can become objects of experience. Metaphysics thereby ceases to be a dogmatic discipline that passes judgments on objects and becomes a transcendental inquiry into the *a priori* conditions of cognition.

The first stage of the inquiry concerns the point at which cognition begins: perception or, in Kant’s terminology, sensibility (*Sinnlichkeit*). The aim of the *Transcendental Aesthetic* (*Transzendente Ästhetik*), the first major division of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, is therefore to demonstrate the *a priori* structure of sensibility. According to Kant, the human mind is not a passive mirror reflecting data received from the external world. All sensible impressions are presented to the understanding through the two forms of sensibility: space (*Raum*) and time (*Zeit*). Space is the form of outer sense, whereas time is the form of inner sense and, indirectly, the universal form of all experience. Kant does not derive these forms from experience, since they precede experience. Our ability to perceive an object as “here,” “there,” “before,” or “after” depends upon this ordering [2, A22–24/B37–39; A30–32/B46–48]. This constitutes the first important branch of Kant’s activity of delimitation, since space and time are not presented as properties belonging to things in themselves (*Dinge an sich*). The direct consequence of this claim is that theoretical cognition can know things not as they are in themselves, but only as they appear to us (*Erscheinungen*). On the other hand, as Kant’s famous formulation indicates—“Thoughts without content are empty; intuitions without concepts are blind” [2, A51/B75]—although space and time provide a manifold of intuition (*Mannigfaltigkeit der Anschauung*), they do not by themselves yield necessary and objective cognition. For this, a second

faculty is required.

The *Transcendental Aesthetic* was written to explain how objects are given, whereas the *Transcendental Analytic* explains how these given objects are thought. The subject of this section is, once again, not individual objects, but the *a priori* principles of the understanding (*Verstand*) that make it possible for objects to become objects of cognition [2, A50/B74–A83/B109]. Only once this issue has been clarified can the following question be answered: Through which fundamental functions can the understanding bring the sensible manifold (*Mannigfaltigkeit*) under unity? These functions will first be identified in the logical forms of judgment, after which the categories will be presented as their pure counterparts applicable to experience. Yet this leads to another question: If the categories are not derived from experience, how can we apply them to experience?

The question of how the categories, once shown to be *a priori*, can yield judgments that are necessary and objectively valid (*objektive Gültigkeit*) with respect to objects in the external world is the starting point of the inquiry Kant calls the *Transcendental Deduction* (*Transzendente Deduktion*). To formulate the question in a way that also clarifies the focus of the present study: On what principle does the connection between the pure concepts of the understanding and the intuitions (*Anschauungen*) given in sensibility (*Sinnlichkeit*) rest? Kant had to establish the principled ground of this connection; otherwise, the categories would remain merely logical forms of thought, with no possibility of yielding objective cognition. Ultimately, then, the purpose of this section is not to establish the origin of the categories, but to justify their objective validity (*objektive Gültigkeit*) and the legitimacy of their application to experience [2, A84–85/B116–17]. Accordingly, “deduction” should be understood here not as a logical inference, but as a justification of a claim to legitimacy.

For an appearance to be recognized as the same object, consciousness must combine the intuitions given in sensibility. According to Kant, however, this act of combination has nothing to do with factual psychological processes such as association, habits of the mind, or mechanisms of memory. For all such explanations take as their basis states of consciousness that actually occur in experience. The *Transcendental Deduction* sets these aside and seeks instead the universal and necessary condition that makes experience possible in every case. From this perspective, synthesis rests not on psychological facts that result from experience, but on a transcendental principle that also makes the operation of the categories possible: the transcendental unity of apperception (*transzendente Einheit der Apperzeption*). This unifying activity, expressed in Kant’s formula “I think” (*Ich denke*), must be able to accompany all representations. Otherwise, manifold appearances could not refer to the same object, and objective experience could not be constituted [2, B131–36].

The fact that apperception (*Apperzeption*) is not a result of the operation of the categories, but rather a precondition for the application of the categories to the manifold of sensory data and thus for the constitution of objective experience, gives rise to a difficulty concerning its ontological and epistemological status that is not easily resolved within the system: the subject that makes it possible to unite all representations under the proposition “I think” is not an object of cognition. For in inner sense, the subject is given not as it is in itself, but as it appears within the form of time [2, B131–36; B157–59]. Apperception is situated here, on the one hand, as the formal and functional unity of thought. Yet in the *Paralogisms*, the claim that it is a substantial soul or a metaphysical self is rejected. The theoretical tension generated by Kant’s system is therefore this: there must be an identical and spontaneous (*Spontaneität*) constitutive activity that makes the unity of experience possible and is thus the ultimate condition of all synthesis.

P. F. Strawson and Paul Guyer argue that, although apperception is defined merely as a formal unity, in the course of the argument it implicitly functions as a constitutive “subject” or “thing,” and that this constitutes a difficulty within the system [5, Chs. 2–3]; [6, Ch. 3]. Henry Allison, by contrast, maintains that such criticisms treat transcendental conditions as though they were ontological entities, whereas apperception is not an object but an epistemic condition of experience [7, Chs. 8–9]. Béatrice Longuenesse attempts to resolve the difficulty by interpreting apperception as a function of reflexive self-consciousness through which representations are united as belonging to a single subject in the act of judging [8]; see also [9, Ch. 8]. Despite the extensive literature that has developed around it, the problem nevertheless remains unresolved within the critical framework: the self-consciousness that conditions experience cannot itself be objectified by the understanding (*Verstand*) under the same conditions. This is not merely a secondary problem concerning the limits of the understanding; it extends to the system as a whole. For the problem of a subject that cannot be objectified under the conditions of theoretical cognition reappears, in a different register, when the Second Critique addresses freedom and autonomy under the moral law. The relation between these two determinations—and, more broadly, the relation between theoretical and practical reason—has not yet been fully clarified within Kant’s critical architecture.

3. FROM BOUNDARY TO THRESHOLD: THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL USES OF REASON

In investigating the conditions of possibility of experience, theoretical reason had first arrived at the *a priori* forms of sensibility (*Sinnlichkeit*), then at the categories of the understanding (*Verstand*), and finally at the transcendental unity of apperception (*transzendente Apperzeption*), which unites all syntheses under a single consciousness. We can clarify the boundary thus reached by turning to the concept of the frame (*parergon*), which Kant employs in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* [10, §14], with examples such as colonnades and drapery, in his account of aesthetic judgment. Here

Kant calls those elements that “do not belong intrinsically to the entire representation of the object as constituents, but only extrinsically as additions” *parerga*, and gives as examples picture frames, drapery on statues, and colonnades around magnificent buildings [10, §14, AA 5:225–26]. If the frame is removed, the painting may appear to remain unchanged; yet the frame also participates in the painting’s appearance as a “work.” The colonnades surrounding a magnificent building do not belong intrinsically to the representation of the building itself, yet they can participate in its aesthetic appearance. Drapery is not part of the human body, yet it alters the way the body appears. The *parergon*, therefore, can neither be regarded as an accidental ornament externally added to the work nor as an intrinsic constituent of the work itself. Indeed, Kant explicitly states that such additions may contribute to beauty when they enhance the pleasure of taste through their form, whereas when they give pleasure merely through their charm, they become mere ornament (*Schmuck*) [10, §14, AA 5:226]. Suppose that the sole function of the frame were to be added externally to the work—that is, that the *parergon* were an entirely indifferent addition. Why, then, would Kant have felt the need to determine the conditions under which it contributes to a judgment of beauty and those under which it becomes mere ornament?

Derrida responds by radicalizing the concept in *La Vérité en peinture*: if the frame indicates where the work (*ergon*) begins and ends, then the work is constituted by something that lies outside its boundary [11, “Parergon,” pp. 15–147]. If, within theoretical reason, transcendental apperception (*transzendente Apperzeption*) is not itself an object within experience and yet makes the unity of experience possible, then, in functional terms, it occupies a position analogous to that of the *parergon*.¹ And if what we call a boundary is related simultaneously to inside and outside—that is, if it is not logically self-sufficient—then the distinction cannot be understood as a relation of complete externality. We must therefore ask: Is the boundary reached by theoretical reason really the end of theoretical reason, or does this boundary operate like a *parergon* that makes the beginning of practical reason possible?

Human reason, by its very nature, seeks the cause of every cause, the condition of every condition, and the ultimate ground of every explanation. This is not an acquired curiosity, but a natural and unavoidable disposition of reason (*Naturanlage der Vernunft*) [2, A795/B823]. Yet Kant adds: “To think of an object and to cognize an object are not the same” [2, B146]. Indeed, one of the claims established throughout the First Critique is that the traditional objects of metaphysics cannot become objects of constitutive cognition (*konstitutive Erkenntnis*). While the Transcendental Aesthetic and the Transcendental Analytic show that cognition acquires objective validity through the conjunction of a concept (*Begriff*) with an intuition (*Anschauung*) that can be given in experience, thinking (*Denken*) consists in the logically consistent employment of concepts without contradiction. This distinction shows that certain concepts lying beyond the limits of theoretical cognition can nevertheless retain their meaning. For being unverifiable within experience is one thing; being meaningless is another. The distinction therefore also provides an important basis for challenging the view, influential especially in the late nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century, that Kant sought to eliminate metaphysics altogether.² Hence Kant’s famous statement, “I had to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith” (*Glauben*) [2, Bxxx], should be read together with his own characterization of the critical undertaking as a limitation (*Einschränkung*) of speculative reason [2, Bxxv]. *Glaube*, in turn, does not signify arbitrary belief independent of justification, but the possibility that questions theoretical reason cannot resolve may be taken up within another use of reason [2, A822/B850–A823/B851].

Cognition (*Erkenntnis*) must remain within the limits of experience and find its object in sensible intuition (*Anschauung*). Reason (*Vernunft*), on the other hand, is satisfied neither with experience nor with what is given in sensibility; it continues to seek the unconditioned (*das Unbedingte*). The fact that thinking does not cease once the claim to cognition is withdrawn shows not that every question exceeding theoretical cognition is thereby meaningless, but that some such questions may acquire a legitimate function within another use of reason. For this reason, it would be appropriate to read the boundary of theoretical reason (*theoretischer Gebrauch der Vernunft*) not merely as a negative limitation, but as a boundary that positively determines the legitimate use of reason. More precisely, although God, the soul, freedom, and the world do not furnish experience with any object, these ideas (*Ideen der Vernunft*), as stated toward the end of the Transcendental Dialectic, provide reason with systematic unity (*systematische Einheit der Vernunft*). For if these ideas were regarded as entirely invalid or meaningless, it would be impossible to account for reason’s natural disposition (*Naturanlage der Vernunft*) toward the unconditioned and its demand for systematic unity. Continuing the same analogy, we can state the point once again: If the boundary lies within theoretical reason, it is no longer entirely a boundary; if it lies outside it, we must explain how theoretical reason can determine it. Between theoretical and practical reason, therefore, there is not a wall but a threshold that separates the two domains while simultaneously connecting them: a *parergon*. A threshold is not itself a distinction; it is where the boundary itself is produced. Consequently, the concepts that make the beginning

¹For without apperception, which is not itself an object within experience, the unity of experience cannot be explained; without the thing in itself, the concept of appearance loses its meaning; and if the idea of freedom is not preserved, natural causality would be absolutized.

²For logical positivists such as Carnap and Ayer, one of Kant’s decisive achievements lies in showing that metaphysics cannot constitute knowledge. Ayer makes this point explicitly in *Language, Truth and Logic* [12]. Carnap, in turn, invokes the Kantian critique of metaphysics within his broader argument that metaphysical propositions lack cognitive meaning [13, pp. 60–81]. Strawson, while regarding Kant’s analysis of experience and the conditions of objective cognition as philosophically valuable, argues that elements such as transcendental idealism and the doctrine of noumena remain problematic metaphysical commitments within Kant’s thought [5]. Cassirer, by contrast, acknowledges the critical restriction of metaphysics while arguing that Kant displaced the determining role traditionally assigned to substance ontology rather than simply abolishing metaphysics [14].

of practical reason possible cannot be situated wholly outside theoretical reason either. They are threshold structures that constitute the boundary of the theoretical system while preserving its relation to what lies beyond theoretical cognition.

The fact that theoretical reason, in drawing its own boundary, establishes the ground on which practical reason can operate may lead to the following conclusion: “The door closed by theoretical reason is reopened by practical reason.” Kant, however, emphasizes that what is at issue here is not two separate reasons, but two different uses (*Gebrauch der Vernunft*) of the same reason (*Vernunft*). The aim of theoretical use (*theoretischer Gebrauch*) is to secure the systematic unity of cognition within the domain of experience. In its practical use (*praktischer Gebrauch*), reason is directed toward determining the will (*Wille*) in accordance with the moral law [2, Bxxii–Bxxx]; [15, Preface, AA 5:3–16]. “What can I know?” is the point of departure for the former, and “What ought I to do?” for the latter. If this is so, we can no longer claim that the Second Critique attempts to construct a new metaphysics in the domain where the First Critique had failed. The question, rather, is this: How can questions that theoretical reason cannot answer within its own limits be addressed from the standpoint of another use of reason?

When concepts excluded from the bounds of theoretical cognition in the First Critique reappear in the Second Critique as necessary concepts for the determination of the will, we see that what changes is not their ontological or conceptual status, but the transcendental function they assume. God, for example, cannot be an object of cognition for theoretical reason because God cannot be given as an object in experience. Practical reason, however, does not attempt to prove the existence of God; it accepts God as a postulate (*Postulat*) with respect to the possibility of the highest good (*das höchste Gut*) required by the moral law. Freedom, by contrast, is not an object of experience for theoretical reason; yet the moral law, of which we become conscious in the “fact of reason” (*Faktum der Vernunft*), grounds freedom as a necessary condition of the will from the standpoint of practical reason, insofar as it compels us to think of ourselves as free.

Can the change in the functions assigned to concepts across the two uses of reason be read as a violation of the boundary reached by the First Critique? Freedom, which theoretical reason can neither verify nor falsify in the First Critique, appears in the Second Critique as a necessary condition of practical reason through our consciousness of the moral law. What Kant calls the *Faktum der Vernunft* is not freedom itself, but our consciousness of the moral law, which imposes itself upon consciousness immediately and necessarily [15, AA 5:31]. Without this necessary and immediate consciousness of the moral law, our consciousness of freedom would not be possible either. On this basis, Kant defines the moral law as the *ratio cognoscendi* of freedom and freedom as the *ratio essendi* of the moral law [15, AA 5:4n]; this opens a necessary passage from consciousness of the moral law to the reality of freedom. Once such a passage is opened, not only freedom but also the postulates of God and the immortality of the soul enter the domain of practical reason. If the Second Critique is to be read as a metaphysical undertaking, it is not easy to find a point of departure other than the *Faktum der Vernunft*. Indeed, Kant does not attempt to ground freedom through the inferences of theoretical reason, through experience, or through a metaphysical demonstration; the objective reality of freedom is secured from the standpoint of practical reason, not by means of a theoretical proof, but through consciousness of the moral law.

Reading the *Faktum* as that which secures the objective reality of freedom from a practical standpoint—in other words, maintaining that the validity that theoretical proof could not provide is established at the level of practical reason through the *Faktum*—nevertheless remains possible. If consciousness of the moral law cannot be derived from another principle and is nevertheless accepted as the necessary starting point of practical reason, the question of how the epistemic status of the *Faktum* is to be understood becomes a problem of justification in its own right. In this respect, the systematic position of the *Faktum* may be considered within a limited analogy to the epistemic position of Descartes’s *cogito*. Just as the *cogito* is the starting point of knowledge, the *Faktum* may be conceived as the first point of support for the grounding of morality.

In this regard, L. W. Beck’s remarks in his discussion of *ratio cognoscendi* are noteworthy. Of particular importance in Beck’s discussion is that the *Faktum* does not follow from another premise and cannot be reduced to another principle [16, pp. 166–72; see also p. 73]. Indeed, in Kant’s own words, the moral law is “the sole fact of pure reason” [15, AA 5:31]; Beck’s interpretation likewise focuses on the epistemic status of this fact insofar as it rests on no further principle [16, pp. 202–12, esp. pp. 210–11]. H. E. Allison, by contrast, argues that Beck’s reading of the *Faktum der Vernunft* as the “ultimate datum” of Kant’s practical philosophy is difficult to reconcile with Kant’s texts. Allison considers in turn the different possibilities as to whether the *Faktum* is the moral law, autonomy, or consciousness of the moral law, and ultimately argues that the *Faktum* is best understood as consciousness of the moral law [17, pp. 231–39, esp. p. 233].

For D. Henrich, however, the *Faktum* is not a new proof that directly replaces theoretical demonstration, but points instead to a different methodological starting point that frees the validity of the moral law from dependence on a theoretical deduction. The critical question leading to this conclusion is the following: How are we to understand Kant’s move from pursuing a deduction of the moral law in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785) to invoking the Fact of Reason (*Faktum der Vernunft*) in the *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788), published only three years later? Henrich interprets this shift as the abandonment in the *Critique of Practical Reason* of the deductive strategy pursued in the *Groundwork*, with the validity of the moral law now being addressed on a different basis. In this respect, the *Faktum der Vernunft*, rather than serving as a substitute for theoretical proof, constitutes a new methodological starting point that

removes the need to derive the validity of the moral law from another theoretical premise [18, pp. 55–87, esp. pp. 55–68].

When the differing interpretations of Beck, Allison, and Henrich concerning the status of the *Faktum* are reread through the model of the boundary proposed here, it can be argued that what is at stake is not a new metaphysical proposition attempting to solve a problem that theoretical reason could not resolve, but a methodological turning point that shows how the relation between theoretical and practical reason is reconstituted under different conditions of validity. From this perspective, the *Faktum* can be read not as an exception that violates the boundary, but as an instance of how the boundary between theoretical and practical reason operates by producing different conditions of authority and validity.

4. PARERGON AND THE UNITY OF THE CRITICAL SYSTEM

The debate over whether the Second Critique is a continuation or a revision of the First Critique has long occupied a central place in Kant scholarship. The positions in this debate can, in broad terms, be divided into two camps. According to the first, the Second Critique preserves the theoretical boundaries drawn in the First Critique; practical reason operates merely within a different domain of use without violating those boundaries. According to the second, the *Faktum der Vernunft* introduces a new beginning into the critical system that cannot be theoretically grounded. Both approaches take theoretical and practical reason from the outset as two distinct domains of authority and differ only over whether a legitimate relation can be established between them. The focus of the debate thus shifts away from the question of what transcendental function the critical boundary performs and becomes instead the problem of how the Second Critique can legitimately reopen the domain theoretically closed by the First Critique.

Beck, Allison, and Henrich arrive at different conclusions. Beck interprets the *Faktum der Vernunft* as the irreducible “ultimate datum” of practical reason; Allison explains it in terms of immediate consciousness of the moral law, through which the objective reality of freedom is established; and Henrich understands it as a new methodological starting point adopted after the deductive strategy pursued in the *Groundwork*. Despite these differences, all three address the same underlying theoretical problem: On what grounds does the Second Critique legitimate anew the domain theoretically delimited by the First Critique? [16, pp. 202–12]; [17, pp. 231–39]; [18, pp. 55–87]

Why might Kant’s commentators have reached different conclusions despite working from the same material? The first explanation that comes to mind is that the texts may be open to different hermeneutic readings. Yet this explanation is not convincing. Unlike aporetic Platonic dialogues, Kant’s texts proceed within a single systematic architecture and construct their conceptual distinctions consistently in accordance with a common critical project: “to map systematically all domains of the use of reason.” Likewise, a rigorous conceptual economy is maintained throughout the texts; fundamental concepts such as *Erkenntnis*, *Vorstellung*, *Anschauung*, *Begriff*, *Verstand*, *Vernunft*, *Idee*, *Urteil*, *Bestimmung*, and *Gebrauch* are assigned technical meanings within the system. In this respect, Kant’s texts approach those of Aristotle, in which the meanings of fundamental concepts such as *οὐσία* (*ousia*), *ἐνέργεια* (*energeia*), *δύναμις* (*dynamis*), and *αἰτία* (*aitia*) are determined through their functions within the system. In both thinkers, conceptual consistency significantly constrains interpretive arbitrariness. Moreover, Kant conceived his works as systematically interconnected stages, each giving rise to the next. The *Analytic* cannot be fully understood without the *Transcendental Aesthetic*, the *Deduction* without the *Analytic*, or the *Dialectic* without the *Deduction*. The same systematic interdependence applies to the relation between the *KrV* and the *KpV*. Indeed, the Preface to the *Critique of Pure Reason* states:

“The whole of pure reason is so perfectly unified that if its principle were insufficient even for answering only one of all the questions imposed upon it by its own nature, one would have to reject it entirely” [2, A xiii].

Kant’s commitment to systematic unity requires the theoretical and practical uses of reason, together with the mediating role assigned to the power of judgment, to be understood within a single critical architecture rather than as independently constituted domains. In this respect, the relation among the three Critiques appears more amenable to being read as a functional transformation than as a rupture. More importantly, this principle constitutes a methodological warning against interpreting the parts of the system independently of one another. Thus, when a tension arises within the system, its source may lie not in the ambiguity of the text, but in the necessity of preserving different principles of the critical architecture simultaneously. None of the distinctions between sensibility (*Sinnlichkeit*) and understanding (*Verstand*), appearance (*Erscheinung*) and noumenon (*Noumenon*), constitutive (*konstitutiv*) and regulative (*regulativ*) use, or theoretical (*theoretischer Gebrauch*) and practical use (*praktischer Gebrauch*) produces an absolute rupture. Each establishes distinct domains of authority while at the same time preventing these domains from becoming wholly alien to one another. Continuing to think freedom while preserving the limits of experience; removing metaphysics from the domain of constitutive cognition while recognizing reason’s orientation toward the unconditioned as legitimate; limiting the authority of theoretical reason while grounding the demands of practical reason: these are different manifestations of the same structure. These manifestations do not contradict one another, nor do the tensions fragment the system; the system remains a system. Moreover, these tensions make the mode of operation of the system visible. For within the critical system, boundaries operate not merely as lines of separation, but as relational structures that make distinction possible. If this is the case, the debates over continuity or rupture within the critical system must also be shifted onto a different plane.

The primary question is not what contents theoretical and practical reason possess, but within what regime of boundaries these contents are articulated with one another. It may therefore be necessary to open a new perspective on debates conducted almost entirely around freedom, the moral law, and the postulates, or even to ask again the more fundamental question that makes these debates possible in the first place: Are the boundaries of the critical system really boundaries that close? This question is more important than whether practical reason introduces new content into theoretical reason.

Kant's critical distinctions initially give the impression of "boundaries drawn between independent domains in order to prevent any passage between them." Second, however, it becomes apparent that the boundaries thus drawn do not belong to the domains they separate. Appearance, for example, is not noumenon; yet the boundary of appearance is not itself located within appearance. Sensibility (*Sinnlichkeit*) is not understanding (*Verstand*); yet the principle that enables these two faculties to be determined in relation to one another belongs exclusively to neither. The same structure recurs in the relation between constitutive (*konstitutiv*) and regulative (*regulativ*) use, theoretical (*theoretischer Gebrauch*) and practical (*praktischer Gebrauch*) use, and the limits of experience and the thought of freedom. The boundary, then, is not a third element subsequently inserted between two already constituted domains. The distinction itself determines what each domain is and the extent to which it is valid. Sensibility (*Sinnlichkeit*), as the mode in which an object is given, is determined only insofar as it is distinguished from the function of thought belonging to the understanding (*Verstand*); the understanding, in turn, acquires objective validity for its concepts only in relation to sensible intuition. These two domains of authority, therefore, are not first constituted independently and subsequently connected. The boundary between them is a condition of the positive determination (*Bestimmung*) of each.

Likewise, appearance (*Erscheinung*) is not simply the domain of objects that remains inside as opposed to the noumenon (*Noumenon*). Without opening a second domain of cognition beyond experience, the concept of the noumenon determines the limits of the validity of phenomenal cognition; in doing so, it determines what theoretical reason can legitimately know precisely by showing what it cannot know [2, A255–56/B311–12]. Here the boundary functions not merely as a negative prohibition, but as a positive determination that makes the objective use of cognition possible. Critical limitation is therefore not the abolition of authority, but the determination of its use (*Gebrauch*). The distinction between constitutive (*konstitutiv*) and regulative (*regulativ*) use does not remove the ideas of reason from the system; rather, it deprives them of the authority to constitute objects while preserving them within another function. The ideas of God, the soul, and the world, for example, cannot be objects of theoretical cognition, yet they continue to operate as regulative principles directing empirical cognition toward systematic unity [2, A642–68/B670–96]. What changes here is not whether the concepts belong to the system, but the nature of the authority accorded to them. Critique, in other words, does not cast concepts from the inside to the outside; it determines under what conditions, within what domain, and with what function they may be employed. In short, the boundary assumes the structure of something that does not wholly abandon what it excludes, but keeps it related to the system under a different status. We may therefore conclude that the boundary is itself the operation that constitutes the distinction.

This brings us back to the question of the frame. Is the frame merely an ornament added to the work (*parergon*)? Kant's distinction in §14 of the *Kritik der Urteilskraft* makes the answer less straightforward than such a formulation suggests. The decisive issue is no longer why Kant distinguishes between what belongs to the representation of the object and what accompanies it as an addition, but what this distinction allows us to see about the boundary between them. Under what conditions can something that does not belong to the work itself nevertheless participate in determining how the work appears? The question becomes particularly significant once it is transferred from Kant's examples—the frame (*Rahmen*), colonnades (*Säulengänge*), and drapery (*Gewänder*)—to the history of representation. For if an element can remain outside the work's proper content while participating in the organization of its field, the distinction between *ergon* and *parergon* can no longer be understood solely in terms of what an object intrinsically is. It must also be examined in terms of the position and function an element acquires within a particular representational order.

The discussions found in Kant and, later, in modern theories of representation concerning whether the frame is merely an ornament (*parergon*) added to the work or an element that participates in determining the boundaries of the work can be read as an extension of the same boundary problem into the aesthetic domain. Kant's three examples—the frame (*Rahmen*), colonnades (*Säulengänge*), and drapery (*Gewänder*)—share the same structure [10, AA 5:225–26]. None belongs to the work itself (*Werk selbst*); yet none is wholly external to it either. The frame does not represent the painting; the colonnade is not a constitutive part of the building; the drapery does not belong to the form of the statue. Nevertheless, each participates in determining where the work begins and where it ends. We can also trace this participation through two paintings that Victor Stoichita uses almost as a laboratory for examining the emergence of modern still life: Joos van Cleve's 1520 *The Crucifixion with Saints and a Donor* and Quentin Massys's *Virgin and Child*. In these paintings, three distinct levels of representation converge on the same surface. Various objects occupy the foreground closest to the viewer. At the center, the Madonna and Child constitute the central sacred narrative (*istoria*). In the background lies the landscape. All three levels belong to the same surface, but they do not possess the same representational status. In Stoichita's account, the principal object of the painting is the center, that is, the sacred narrative. The still life in the foreground and the landscape in the

background are *parerga* in relation to the representation of the Madonna [19, pp. 59–60]. Nevertheless, they participate in establishing the visual hierarchy that makes the center a center; they bring the foreground closer to the viewer, push the sacred narrative back, and divide the representational surface into different degrees of depth and importance. The *parergon*, therefore, is not merely an element externally added to the *ergon* in these examples, but a relational position that enables the *ergon* to appear as the center. Yet this position is not fixed either.

In the works of Joos van Cleve or Quentin Massys, the everyday objects placed in the foreground belong to the same pictorial surface as the sacred scene, yet remain subordinate to the central *istoria* within the representational hierarchy. By the time Georg Flegel painted his seventeenth-century *Still Life*, there was no longer a sacred narrative to subordinate these objects; the threshold between the two representational worlds disappears. Food, bread, fruit, wine vessels, fish, flowers, and everyday tableware, previously situated in front of, at the margins of, or around another representation, become the subjects of independent paintings. The art-historical significance here lies not merely in the “realistic representation of objects,” but in the fact that objects formerly subordinated to the center now entirely occupy the center of the representational surface. How does Flegel achieve this? The objects are generally arranged very close to the viewer within a narrow spatial field. The tabletop occupies the lower part of the painting; vessels, food, and fruit partially overlap one another; light accentuates differences among their surfaces—the transparency of glass, the sheen of metal, the texture of bread, the skin of fruit. In place of an expansive narrative space extending into depth, there thus emerges a concentrated surface field in which the gaze moves among objects.

Stoichita formulates this result in particularly striking terms: still life is a “threshold” that has become painting [19, pp. 60–62]. The threshold’s becoming painting—that is, the movement toward the center of a repertoire of objects that, within another composition, constituted the boundary and visibility of the center—finds a first structural counterpart in the *Grenzbegriff*, which determines the domain of phenomenal cognition without belonging to its positive content [2, A255/B311]. A second instance in which what delimits the center undergoes a change of status appears when what is held at the boundary from the standpoint of theoretical reason acquires a different status in practical use. Freedom is the strongest example. The *KrV* prevents speculative reason from turning freedom into an object of theoretical cognition; in the *KpV*, by contrast, freedom acquires a necessary status with respect to the reality of pure practical reason [15, AA 5:3–6, 29–31]. What changes here is not the concept of freedom itself, but its functional status within the system. What is *parergonal* is not *parergonal* in any absolute sense; it is *parergonal* by virtue of the position it occupies in relation to another *ergon*. Noumenon and freedom never become “centers” in the same direct sense in which still life becomes an independent pictorial genre; rather, as the relational order within which they are situated changes, they undergo a functional shift structurally analogous to the transformation from *parergon* to *ergon*.

Ambrosius Bosschaert’s *Vase of Flowers* takes this transformation one step further. What occurs here is not merely that former *parerga* occupy the vacated center, but that the representational order within which center and periphery had been defined is itself transformed. Stoichita describes this transformation as a “conceptual synthesis” [19, pp. 62–63]. The significance of this transformation lies in the fact that the status of the represented objects can no longer be explained by their position within the earlier hierarchy. Flowers and landscape do not simply exchange their peripheral status for a central one; rather, the relations through which such positions had previously been assigned have themselves been reorganized. Bosschaert’s painting thus makes visible a change not merely in what occupies the pictorial field, but in the order that determines how the elements within that field acquire their representational status.

Alpers’s analysis of seventeenth-century Dutch painting carries this transformation beyond the level of composition: what changes is not merely the center, but the representational regime that produces the hierarchy between center and periphery. In the Italian tradition, *istoria* had made “significant human actions” the organizing principle of painting, positioning objects and landscape in relation to the central narrative. In the Dutch model, which Alpers characterizes in terms of the “description of the visible world,” this priority gives way to an order of representation in which everyday objects can become subjects of painting in their own right [20, pp. xx–xxv]. This transformation does not simply reverse the relation Stoichita identifies between the central *istoria* and its subordinate *parerga*; rather, it entails the disappearance of the very center that made this hierarchy possible.

From this perspective, the disappearance of the Madonna in Bosschaert’s *Vase of Flowers* cannot be read merely as the absence of the central figure. Stoichita’s reading of the painting is as follows: still life and landscape, which had previously flanked the sacred narrative from opposite sides, now confront one another directly once the central scene disappears. The middle distance formerly reserved for the sacred *istoria* is no longer there; the window recess, meanwhile, establishes a new relation between the two representational fields by positioning the flowers in the foreground and opening the landscape as a view behind them [19, pp. 62–63]. What disappears, therefore, is not merely the Madonna, but the central reference that made still life “subordinate” and landscape “background.”

The implications of the change Alpers identifies at the level of the representational regime for the status of objects can be seen more clearly through Bryson’s distinction between *megalography* and *rhopography*. While historically, religiously, and publicly significant actions belong to *megalography*, everyday and “low” reality is relegated to *rhopography*; still life,

in turn, transforms this *low-plane reality*, from which the great event has receded, into an autonomous field of representation [21, pp. 60–61, 135–36]. What occurs here is not the elevation of low-status objects within the existing hierarchy; it is a change in the relation that made them low-status in the first place. Yet this conclusion raises a new question: If the representational status of an object is not intrinsic to it, where is that status produced?

Since what makes an object central or peripheral is not something it carries within itself, we cannot seek the distinction between *ergon* and *parergon* in the fixed properties of objects either. The same element may be subordinate in one representational order and central in another. What changes here is not the object itself, but the place and authority assigned to it within the representational order. In Kant's critical distinctions, similarly, the boundary does not always remove from the system what it excludes. The noumenon is not an object of phenomenal cognition; yet it limits the extent to which appearances can be cognized [2, A255–56/B311–12]. The ideas of reason cannot provide constitutive cognition; yet in their regulative use they retain their function with respect to systematic unity [2, A642–68/B670–96]. Freedom, while incapable of becoming an object of cognition for theoretical reason, acquires a necessary status in practical reason as the *ratio essendi* of the moral law [15, AA 5:4n, 29–31]. Critique thus does more than determine to which concepts a door is open and to which it is closed. It determines through which door, and in what capacity, concepts may pass. For this reason, what is decisive in the theoretical/practical, constitutive/regulative, or appearance/noumenon distinctions is not merely belonging, but use (*Gebrauch*), authority, and function. That a concept is invalid within one domain does not mean that it is without function within the system. Just as in the transition of still life from *parergon* to *ergon*, a change of status need not constitute a violation of the boundary; it may instead be the boundary operating differently within a different order of relations.

Stoichita's transition from *parergon* to *ergon*, Alpers's dissolution of the *istoria*-centered order of representation, and Bryson's distinction between *megalography* and *rhopography* converge on the same point: the *parergon* is not a subordinate element standing outside the center, but a problem of the boundary that reveals the relations through which center and periphery, inside and outside, and ultimately belonging itself are produced. It would therefore be mistaken to search for the *parergon* as a fourth domain concealed between the Critiques or as an intermediary faculty connecting theoretical and practical reason. Its primary significance for the critical system lies in showing what the boundary does. Kant's system does not derive its unity from the disappearance of boundaries. Appearance does not become noumenon; theoretical use is not reduced to practical use; the regulative does not acquire constitutive authority. Yet precisely because of these distinctions, the domains are not entirely closed off from one another. The noumenon remains outside phenomenal cognition while determining its boundary; freedom, which theoretical reason cannot transform into cognition, acquires a different status in practical reason; regulative ideas do not constitute their objects, but guide the systematic use of reason. The boundary here is not a wall, but a distribution of authority: it determines what is valid where, in what sense, and with what function. The unity of the critical system must therefore be sought not in the identity of its parts, but in the ordering of their differences.

5. CONCLUSION

Paradoxically, Ambrosius Bosschaert's *Vase of Flowers* does not contain a composition that brings the vase itself to the fore. The flowers stand before a window recess. A landscape opens behind them. Yet the window is neither simply inside nor outside. As Stoichita observes, while opening the enclosed space of the niche toward the viewer, it simultaneously becomes a frame; it turns the flowers into a "threshold object" and the landscape into the field seen beyond them [19, p. 62]. If we remove the framing structure, however, the painting is no longer the same painting. For where the flowers stand, where the landscape begins, and what each is in relation to the other are no longer clearly determined. The frame is not the subject of the painting; yet it determines the relations within which the elements of the painting acquire visibility. Likewise, the *parergon* cannot be reduced to an addition attached to the work, but functions as the relational boundary that determines where the *ergon* begins and where it ends.

The argument of this article is therefore not that the boundary between theoretical and practical reason disappears. On the contrary, the system is a system because it has boundaries. Yet if the boundary is conceived merely as a wall separating independently constituted domains, some of the most significant movements within Kant's critical architecture become difficult to explain. Freedom provides the clearest example. The concept remains the same across the theoretical and practical employments of reason, while its systematic status is determined differently in each: theoretical reason restricts its claim to cognition, whereas practical reason grants it an authority that theoretical cognition cannot establish. The boundary thus does not simply decide whether freedom lies inside or outside the critical system; it determines the conditions under which freedom can legitimately function within it. A comparable structure appears in the field of representation: what functions as a *parergon* within one compositional order may become an *ergon* within another. The point is not that the distinction between *ergon* and *parergon* collapses, but that their relation cannot be adequately understood as a fixed division between two independently constituted classes of objects. This article has not sought to establish a historical relation of influence between Kant and modern theories of representation. It has used their convergence around the problem of the boundary to make visible a structural feature of Kant's critical system.

When we consider Bosschaert's *Vase of Flowers*, Kant's conceptualization of the *parergon* in §14, and the operation of boundaries between the Critiques, a different conception of the unity of Kant's critical system becomes possible. This unity is secured neither by a more fundamental principle underlying the distinctions nor by a hidden passage opened between the Critiques. It is the distinctions themselves that produce unity. Appearance does not become noumenon; theoretical use does not become practical use; nor does the regulative acquire constitutive authority. The critical system does not abolish these differences; it preserves them. Yet preserving them does not mean closing the domains off from one another. For the boundary determines not only what remains outside, but also what relation that which remains outside can establish with what lies inside. The noumenon can mark the boundary of cognition without becoming an object of cognition; freedom can become necessary for practical reason without being theoretically cognized; and the ideas of reason can function as regulative principles without acquiring constitutive validity. What changes is not freedom, but the place freedom occupies within the system. This shift exemplifies the broader operation of critique: concepts need not cross the boundaries between domains in order to acquire a different systematic status within them. What critique does, then, is not merely to keep concepts inside or outside the system, but to accord them different forms of authority within different domains of use. The unity of the Critiques must therefore be sought not in an eventual reconciliation of the theoretical and the practical, but in the capacity to order the different uses of the same reason together within one critical system without reducing one to the other.

AUTHORS' CONTRIBUTION

All authors contributed equally to the conception, development, and preparation of this research. All authors read, critically reviewed, and approved the final version of this article for publication.

CONFLICTS OF INTEREST

Authors declare that they do not have any conflicts of interest.

FUNDING INFORMATION

This research received no external funding, and no specific funding was available for the preparation of this study.

DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

All data required to support the findings and conclusions of this research are included within the present paper.

DECLARATION ON THE USE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

Generative artificial intelligence tools were used solely to assist with the English translation and linguistic editing of the manuscript and with the formatting and standardization of the references. The authors reviewed and verified the final text and take full responsibility for its content.

REFERENCES

- [1] Kant, Immanuel. *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*. 2nd ed., edited and translated by Mary Gregor and Jens Timmermann, introduction by Christine M. Korsgaard, Cambridge University Press, 2012.
- [2] Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of Pure Reason*. Edited and translated by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood, Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- [3] Kant, Immanuel. "Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Come Forward as Science." *Theoretical Philosophy after 1781*, edited by Henry Allison and Peter Heath, translated by Gary Hatfield, Cambridge University Press, 2002, pp. 29–170.
- [4] Hume, David. *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*. Edited by Tom L. Beauchamp, Oxford University Press, 1999.
- [5] Strawson, P. F. *The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*. Methuen, 1966.
- [6] Guyer, Paul. *Kant and the Claims of Knowledge*. Cambridge University Press, 1987.
- [7] Allison, Henry E. *Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense*. Revised and enlarged ed., Yale University Press, 2004.

-
- [8] Longuenesse, Béatrice. *I, Me, Mine: Back to Kant, and Back Again*. Oxford University Press, 2017.
 - [9] Longuenesse, Béatrice. *Kant and the Capacity to Judge: Sensibility and Discursivity in the Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason*. Translated by Charles T. Wolfe, Princeton University Press, 1998.
 - [10] Kant, Immanuel. *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. Edited and translated by Paul Guyer, translated by Eric Matthews, Cambridge University Press, 2000.
 - [11] Derrida, Jacques. *The Truth in Painting*. Translated by Geoffrey Bennington and Ian McLeod, University of Chicago Press, 1987.
 - [12] Ayer, A. J. *Language, Truth and Logic*. 2nd ed., Victor Gollancz, 1946.
 - [13] Carnap, Rudolf. "The Elimination of Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language." *Logical Positivism*, edited by A. J. Ayer, Free Press, 1959, pp. 60–81.
 - [14] Cassirer, Ernst. *Kant's Life and Thought*. Translated by James Haden, introduction by Stephan Körner, Yale University Press, 1981.
 - [15] Kant, Immanuel. "Critique of Practical Reason." *Practical Philosophy*, edited and translated by Mary J. Gregor, introduction by Allen W. Wood, Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 133–272.
 - [16] Beck, Lewis White. *Studies in the Philosophy of Kant*. Bobbs-Merrill, 1965.
 - [17] Allison, Henry E. *Kant's Theory of Freedom*. Cambridge University Press, 1990.
 - [18] Henrich, Dieter. "The Concept of Moral Insight and Kant's Doctrine of the Fact of Reason." *The Unity of Reason: Essays on Kant's Philosophy*, edited by Richard L. Velkley, Harvard University Press, 1994, pp. 55–87.
 - [19] Stoichita, Victor I. *The Self-Aware Image: An Insight into Early Modern Meta-Painting*. Translated by Anne-Marie Glasheen, Cambridge University Press, 1997.
 - [20] Alpers, Svetlana. *The Art of Describing: Dutch Art in the Seventeenth Century*. University of Chicago Press, 1983.
 - [21] Bryson, Norman. *Looking at the Overlooked: Four Essays on Still Life Painting*. Harvard University Press, 1990.