Research Article

Received: 12 February, 2026
Accepted: 10 April, 2026
Published: 27 April, 2026

Do Governance and Corruption Shape Informality? Evidence from Firms and Citizens in Vietnam

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Cite this article:

Phong, P. V., Thuy, B. T. T., Dung, P. M., & Lien, T. T. P. (2026). Do Governance and Corruption Shape Informality? Evidence from Firms and Citizens in Vietnam. Cultura Científica, (24), pp. 148 - 158.

Abstract

This paper examines the relationship between governance quality, corruption, and informality using subnational panel data from Vietnam. By combining the Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI), which captures firm-level experiences, and the Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI), which reflects citizen-level perceptions, the study provides a dual-perspective assessment of local institutions. The results reveal a striking asymmetry. Improvements in firm-oriented governance are associated with lower levels of informality, while higher citizen-perceived governance quality is linked to increased reported informal payments. These findings suggest that governance reforms may have reduced regulatory frictions for firms but have not eliminated informal practices in public service delivery. The role of corruption appears weaker once governance is accounted for, indicating that it is embedded within broader institutional conditions. The results are robust across alternative measures of informality and model specifications. This paper contributes to the literature by highlighting the multidimensional nature of governance and the importance of distinguishing between firm and citizen experiences. The findings underscore the need for more targeted reforms to address informal payments in citizen–state interactions.

Keywords: governance quality, corruption, informality, informal economy, public administration, institutional quality, vietnam

1. INTRODUCTION

Over the past decades, the persistence of informality has remained one of the central puzzles in development economics and public governance. Despite sustained economic growth and institutional reforms, a substantial share of economic activity in many developing and transition economies continues to operate outside formal regulatory frameworks. Informality is not merely a residual outcome of underdevelopment, but is increasingly understood as a rational response by households and firms to the institutional environment in which they operate [1].

A growing body of research highlights that governance quality and corruption are among the most critical institutional determinants shaping the size and structure of the informal economy. Weak governance increases transaction costs, reduces trust in public institutions, and creates uncertainty, thereby discouraging formalization [2, 3]. At the same time, corruption may either facilitate or hinder formal sector participation, depending on whether informal payments act as a substitute for inefficient regulation or as an additional burden that deters compliance [4]. Recent empirical work tends to support the latter mechanism, showing that corruption often functions as an "informal tax" that disproportionately affects smaller and less productive firms [5].

However, an important limitation in the existing literature is that governance and corruption are typically measured from a single perspective, either from firms or from citizens. This creates an incomplete picture of how institutional quality is experienced across different economic actors. Firms and households interact with the state through different channels, face different regulatory constraints, and respond differently to institutional weaknesses. As a result, their perceptions and experiences of governance may diverge significantly, with important implications for economic behavior, including decisions to remain informal.

This paper addresses this gap by combining two unique and complementary datasets from Vietnam: the Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI), which captures firm-level experiences with governance, and the Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI), which reflects citizen-level perceptions and experiences. By integrating these two perspectives at the provincial level, the paper provides a more comprehensive assessment of how governance and corruption shape informality.

Vietnam offers an especially suitable setting for this analysis. As a transition economy, Vietnam has undergone rapid structural transformation while retaining substantial regional variation in governance quality and institutional performance. Although national policies are relatively uniform, implementation varies widely across provinces, creating meaningful subnational institutional heterogeneity [6, 7]. At the same time, informality remains pervasive, particularly among small enterprises and household businesses, making it a critical policy concern.

The central research questions of this paper are threefold. First, how does governance quality at the provincial level affect the extent of informality? Second, what is the role of corruption in shaping informal economic behavior? Third, do firms and citizens respond differently to governance and corruption, and how do these differences translate into variation in informality?

Methodologically, the paper exploits panel variation across provinces and over time, combining fixed-effects models with alternative measures of governance and corruption. Particular attention is given to the interaction between governance quality and corruption, as well as to the divergence between firm-based and citizen-based institutional indicators.

The findings contribute to the literature in three ways. First, the paper provides evidence on the institutional determinants of informality in a transition economy, complementing existing cross-country studies. Second, it introduces a dual-perspective approach to governance measurement, highlighting the importance of considering both firm and citizen experiences. Third, it offers policy-relevant insights into how improvements in governance and anti-corruption efforts may promote formalization.

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

The relationship between governance, corruption, and informality has attracted increasing attention in recent years, reflecting a broader shift from structural explanations toward institutional perspectives. Early studies emphasized the role of economic development, taxation, and labor market rigidities in explaining informality [8]. More recent work, however, highlights the central role of institutional quality, particularly governance effectiveness and corruption control [1, 9].

2.1. GOVERNANCE AND INFORMALITY

Governance quality influences informality through multiple channels. Effective governance reduces regulatory uncertainty, improves public service delivery, and lowers the cost of compliance, thereby encouraging firms and households to operate formally [3]. Conversely, weak governance increases bureaucratic burdens and reduces the perceived benefits of formalization.

Recent empirical studies confirm these mechanisms. For example, better regulatory quality is associated with lower levels of informality across developing countries. Similarly, improvements in local governance significantly reduce informal employment. These findings are consistent with the broader literature on institutional economics, which emphasizes the role of credible and efficient institutions in supporting market development.

2.2. CORRUPTION AND INFORMALITY

The relationship between corruption and informality is theoretically ambiguous. On the one hand, the "grease the wheels" hypothesis suggests that corruption may facilitate economic activity by allowing firms to bypass inefficient regulations [10]. On the other hand, the "sand the wheels" perspective argues that corruption increases costs and uncertainty, discouraging formal participation [11].

Recent evidence increasingly supports the latter view. Corruption is associated with lower economic efficiency and higher levels of informality. Firms facing higher informal payments are more likely to remain unregistered. In transition economies, where institutions are still evolving, corruption tends to act as a barrier rather than a facilitator of formalization [5].

2.3. FIRM VS CITIZEN PERSPECTIVES

A key limitation of the literature is the reliance on single-source measures of governance. Most studies use either firm-level surveys, such as the World Bank Enterprise Surveys, or perception-based indicators derived from households. However, governance is inherently multidimensional, and its effects may differ across actors.

Firms typically interact with the state through regulatory and administrative channels, while citizens experience governance through public services and local authorities. These differences may lead to systematic variation in perceptions and responses [6, 7]. Recent work has begun to explore these discrepancies, but empirical evidence remains limited, particularly at the subnational level.

2.4. VIETNAM CONTEXT

Vietnam provides a valuable setting in which to study these issues. Despite strong economic growth, informality remains widespread, particularly among small and household enterprises [12]. At the same time, governance quality varies significantly across provinces, reflecting differences in administrative capacity and political incentives [6].

Existing studies on Vietnam have examined the role of governance in firm performance and investment [13], but relatively few have focused explicitly on informality or on the interaction between governance and corruption. Moreover, the combined use of PAPI and PCI data remains rare, leaving an important gap that this paper seeks to address.

3. METHODOLOGY

3.1. DATA SOURCES

This study combines two complementary datasets that capture different dimensions of governance in Vietnam.

First, the Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI), compiled annually by the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry, provides firm-level assessments of local economic governance. The PCI captures key aspects of the business environment, including transparency, entry costs, time costs, and informal charges. It has been widely used to study subnational institutional variation in Vietnam [6].

Second, the Provincial Governance and Public Administration Performance Index (PAPI), jointly developed by CECODES, VFF-CRT, and UNDP, measures citizen experiences with governance. PAPI focuses on accountability, corruption, and public service delivery, reflecting how governance is perceived and experienced at the household level.

The combination of PCI and PAPI allows this study to capture governance from two distinct perspectives: firms and citizens. This dual measurement strategy provides a more comprehensive assessment of institutional quality than single-source indicators.

The analysis uses a balanced panel of Vietnamese provinces over the period 2019–2024. The panel structure enables the exploitation of both cross-sectional and temporal variation in governance and informality.

3.2. VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION

3.2.1 Dependent Variable: Informality

Informality is measured using a composite index that combines firm-based and citizen-based indicators.

From PCI, informality is proxied by the informal charges sub-index, which reflects the prevalence of unofficial payments faced by firms. From PAPI, informality is measured using indicators of informal payments in public services, including healthcare, education, land administration, and local administrative procedures.

To improve comparability and reduce measurement error, all components are standardized and aggregated into a composite informality index. This approach is consistent with recent work emphasizing the multidimensional nature of informality [1].

In addition, alternative dependent variables are used for robustness, including PCI-based informal charges and PAPI-based informal payment measures.

3.2.2 Key independent variables

Governance is measured using both firm-based and citizen-based indicators.

Firm-oriented governance is constructed from PCI sub-indices capturing transparency, entry costs, time costs, and legal institutions. These indicators reflect the regulatory environment faced by firms.

Citizen-oriented governance is derived from PAPI indices capturing accountability, public administration quality, and service delivery.

A composite governance index is constructed by combining these two dimensions. Importantly, the empirical analysis also separates PCI and PAPI governance measures to examine potential asymmetries.

Corruption is measured using the PAPI control-of-corruption index, which reflects citizen perceptions and experiences of corruption in the public sector. The variable is transformed such that higher values indicate worse corruption, facilitating interpretation.

This approach avoids conceptual overlap with the informality measure derived from PCI, ensuring a clearer distinction between corruption and informal economic activity.

3.2.3 Control variables

The empirical models include a standard set of control variables commonly used in the literature on informality and institutional quality.

These include: GDP per capita (log), capturing the level of economic development; population density (log), reflecting urbanization and economic concentration; industrial growth, proxying structural transformation; and the Human Development Index (HDI), capturing broader socio-economic conditions. These controls follow established empirical specifications [3].

3.3. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY

3.3.1 Baseline specification

To examine the relationship between governance, corruption, and informality, the study estimates the following baseline model:

$$Informality_{pt} = \beta_1 Governance_{pt} + \beta_2 Corruption_{pt} + X_{pt} + \mu_p + \lambda_t + \mathcal{E}_{pt},$$

where p indexes provinces and t indexes years. X_{pt} denotes control variables, μ_p captures province fixed effects, and λ_t captures year fixed effects.

Province fixed effects control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity, such as geography and historical institutional conditions, while year fixed effects account for common macroeconomic shocks.

Given the relatively short time dimension of the panel, the baseline specification relies on contemporaneous variables rather than lagged values. This approach preserves sample size and follows common practice in subnational panel studies.

3.3.2 Dual governance specification

To explore heterogeneity in governance effects, the analysis estimates an extended model that separates firm-based and citizen-based governance:

$$Informality_{pt} = \beta_1 PCI_{pt} + \beta_2 PAPI_{pt} + \beta_3 Corruption_{pt} + X_{pt} + \mu_p + \lambda_t + \mathcal{E}_{pt}.$$

This specification allows the identification of asymmetric effects across different institutional domains.

3.3.3 Interaction effects

To examine whether governance moderates the effect of corruption, the model includes an interaction term:

$$Informality_{pt} = \beta_1 Governance_{pt} + \beta_2 Corruption_{pt} + \beta_3 \left(Governance_{pt} \times Corruption_{pt} \right) + X_{pt} + \mu_p + \lambda_t + \mathcal{E}_{pt}.$$

A statistically significant interaction term would indicate that the impact of corruption depends on the level of governance quality.

3.3.4 Identification considerations

A key empirical challenge is potential endogeneity arising from reverse causality and omitted variables. Provinces with higher informality may also exhibit weaker governance, and unobserved factors may jointly influence both variables.

The empirical strategy mitigates these concerns in three ways.

First, province fixed effects control for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity. Second, year fixed effects capture common shocks affecting all provinces. Third, the use of independent governance measures from PCI and PAPI reduces measurement error and strengthens identification.

While these strategies do not fully eliminate endogeneity concerns, they provide a credible framework for identifying conditional associations, consistent with the empirical literature on institutions and development.

4. RESULTS

4.1. STATISTICAL DESCRIPTION

Table 1 reports summary statistics for the main variables. The composite informality index exhibits substantial variation across provinces and over time, indicating meaningful heterogeneity in informal practices. Governance indicators display moderate dispersion, with firm-based (PCI) and citizen-based (PAPI) measures differing in scale and variability, reflecting their distinct institutional dimensions. The corruption variable is standardized and shows considerable variation across provinces. Control variables such as income, population density, and industrial growth fall within expected ranges for a subnational panel in a developing economy. Overall, the data provide sufficient variation to support the empirical analysis.

Table 1. *Summary Statistics*

	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Composite informality index	373	0.007	0.713	-4.279	1.996
PCI informal charges	378	-6.781	0.638	-8.392	-4.706
PAPI informal payments index	373	-0.000	0.938	-6.202	2.101
Composite governance index	373	0.000	0.509	-4.558	1.074
PCI governance index	378	0.000	0.539	-1.683	1.381
PAPI governance index	373	-0.000	0.859	-9.555	1.260
Higher values indicate worse corruption	373	0.000	1.000	-1.797	8.001
Log GDP per capita	378	4.260	0.447	3.339	5.919
Log population density	378	5.744	0.993	3.932	8.424
Industrial growth	378	108.201	9.540	73.050	143.580
Human Development Index	378	0.707	0.050	0.580	0.830

Notes: All index variables are standardized (z-scores) unless otherwise stated. For the PCI informal charges index, higher values originally indicate lower levels of informality; the sign is reversed in the empirical analysis so that higher values correspond to higher informality. Corruption is measured such that higher values indicate worse corruption.

Table 2 presents the pairwise correlations among the main variables. The composite informality index is positively correlated with overall governance; however, this aggregate relationship conceals important heterogeneity across governance dimensions. Specifically, PCI-based governance is negatively correlated with informality, whereas PAPI-based governance exhibits a positive correlation. This divergence provides preliminary evidence of a dual governance effect, which is further examined in the regression analysis.

Table 2. *Correlation Matrix*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Composite informality index (1)	1.000								
Composite governance index (2)	0.209***	1.000							
PCI governance index (3)	-0.208***	0.534***	1.000						
PAPI governance index (4)	0.377***	0.850***	0.008	1.000					
Higher values indicate worse corruption (5)	-0.374***	-0.746***	-0.103*	-0.819***	1.000				
Log GDP per capita (6)	-0.268***	0.111**	0.226***	-0.010	0.069	1.000			
Log population density (7)	-0.187***	0.026	0.116**	-0.042	0.048	0.579***	1.000		
Industrial growth (8)	0.013	-0.042	-0.002	-0.048	0.054	-0.028	-0.008	1.000	
Human Development Index (9)	-0.167***	0.060	0.106**	0.005	0.051	0.730***	0.575***	0.010	1.000

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Corruption is strongly negatively correlated with governance measures, particularly the PAPI index, suggesting a close association between perceived governance quality and corruption control. Correlations among the control variables are moderate, with GDP per capita and human development displaying strong positive associations. Importantly, no evidence of severe multicollinearity is observed.

4.2. BASELINE RESULTS

Table 3 presents the baseline fixed-effects estimates of the relationship between governance, corruption, and informality. Column (1) reports a simple specification including only the composite governance index. The coefficient on governance is positive and statistically significant, suggesting that, in aggregate, higher governance scores are associated with higher levels of observed informality. However, this result should be interpreted with caution, as the composite index combines heterogeneous dimensions of governance that may exert opposing effects.

Table 3. *Governance, corruption, and informality*

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Composite governance index	0.419***	0.095		-0.023
	(0.149)	(0.172)		(0.156)
Corruption		-0.197*	0.009	-0.156
		(0.106)	(0.094)	(0.108)
PCI governance			-0.295***	
			(0.097)	
PAPI governance			0.321***	
			(0.078)	
Governance × Corruption				0.035
				(0.032)
Log GDP per capita	-0.795	-0.771	-0.314	-0.694
	(0.759)	(0.771)	(0.690)	(0.791)
Log population density	-4.183	-4.102*	-2.109	-3.851
	(2.611)	(2.449)	(2.187)	(2.438)
Industrial growth	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.001
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)
HDI	0.357	0.128	0.014	0.140
	(1.754)	(1.572)	(1.556)	(1.584)
Observations	370	370	370	370
Within R-squared	0.33	0.36	0.42	0.37

Standard errors in parentheses. Province fixed effects included. Year fixed effects included. Clustered standard errors at the provincial level.
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Column (2) introduces the corruption variable. The coefficient on governance becomes statistically insignificant, while corruption exhibits a negative association with informality at the 10 percent level. Given that the corruption measure is constructed such that higher values indicate worse corruption, this finding suggests that corruption is weakly associated with lower measured informality. This counterintuitive result likely reflects measurement overlap and reporting effects, a point that is further explored below.

A clearer pattern emerges in Column (3), where governance is decomposed into firm-based (PCI) and citizen-based (PAPI) components. The estimates reveal a striking divergence. PCI governance is negatively and significantly associated with informality, indicating that improvements in the business environment reduce informal practices among firms. In contrast, PAPI governance is positively and significantly associated with informality, implying that higher citizen-perceived governance quality coincides with higher reported informal payments.

Column (4) examines whether governance moderates the effect of corruption through an interaction term. The interaction is not statistically significant, suggesting that governance does not systematically attenuate or amplify the relationship between corruption and informality in this setting.

Overall, the results indicate that the relationship between governance and informality is not uniform but depends critically on how governance is measured.

4.3. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS

Table 4 reports robustness checks using alternative dependent variables. Columns (1) and (2) replace the composite informality index with its individual components: PCI-based informal charges and PAPI-based informal payments, respectively.

When PCI informal charges are used as the dependent variable, governance is negatively and significantly associated with informality. This reinforces the interpretation that improvements in firm-oriented governance reduce informal practices in the business sector.

Table 4. *Robustness checks*

	(1)	(2)
	PCI informality	PAPI bribery
Composite governance index	-0.256**	0.561**
	(0.103)	(0.218)
Corruption	-0.080	-0.247
	(0.053)	(0.153)
Log GDP per capita	-0.845	-0.155
	(0.614)	(0.718)
Log population density	-6.483**	1.924
	(2.810)	(2.601)
Industrial growth	0.001	0.002
	(0.003)	(0.003)
HDI	-0.892	1.366
	(1.397)	(2.363)
Observations	373	370
Within R-squared	0.39	0.35

Standard errors in parentheses. Province fixed effects included. Year fixed effects included. Clustered standard errors at the provincial level.
** $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$*

In contrast, when PAPI informal payments are used as the outcome, governance is positively and significantly associated with informality. This mirrors the baseline findings and confirms that the positive relationship between governance and informality is driven by citizen-reported experiences.

An alternative composite informality index yields similar qualitative results, further supporting the robustness of the main findings (Table 5).

Table 5. *Robustness check with alternative informality measure*

	(1)
	Alternative informality index
Composite governance index	-0.033
	(0.169)
Corruption	-0.167
	(0.102)
Log GDP per capita	-0.488
	(0.688)
Log population density	-4.158
	(2.630)
Industrial growth	0.002
	(0.003)
HDI	-0.009
	(1.696)
Observations	370
Within R-squared	0.36

Standard errors in parentheses. Province fixed effects included. Year fixed effects included. Clustered standard errors at the provincial level.
** $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$*

Figure 1 illustrates the marginal effects of corruption across different levels of governance. The estimated effects are relatively stable and statistically insignificant, consistent with the regression results in Table 3. This suggests that the interaction between governance and corruption is limited in explaining variation in informality.



Figure 1. *Marginal effects of corruption across different levels of governance*

5. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS

5.1. A DUAL PERSPECTIVE ON GOVERNANCE

The most important finding of this study is the asymmetric effect of governance depending on whether it is measured from the perspective of firms or citizens. While firm-based governance (PCI) reduces informality, citizen-based governance (PAPI) is associated with higher reported informal payments.

This divergence highlights the multidimensional nature of governance. Firms and citizens interact with the state through different institutional channels. Firms are primarily affected by regulatory procedures, licensing, and inspections, while citizens engage with frontline public services such as healthcare, education, and local administration. As a result, improvements in one domain do not necessarily translate into improvements in the other.

This finding is consistent with the broader literature emphasizing that governance reforms often produce uneven outcomes across sectors and actors [6, 7].

5.2. GOVERNANCE AND INFORMALITY: MECHANISMS

The negative relationship between PCI governance and informality aligns with standard institutional arguments. Better governance reduces transaction costs, enhances transparency, and lowers the need for informal payments, thereby encouraging formalization [3].

However, the positive association between PAPI governance and informal payments requires further interpretation. Several mechanisms may explain this pattern.

First, improved governance may increase citizens' interaction with public services. As access expands, opportunities for informal payments may also rise, particularly in contexts where frontline corruption persists.

Second, better governance may enhance transparency and reporting. In provinces with higher governance quality, citizens may be more willing to report informal payments, leading to higher observed levels without necessarily implying higher actual corruption.

Third, governance reforms may be uneven, benefiting the business sector more than public service delivery. This "dual-track" reform process has been documented in transition economies, where business environments improve faster than administrative practices affecting citizens [5].

5.3. THE LIMITED ROLE OF CORRUPTION

The empirical results suggest that corruption, as measured in this study, does not play a strong independent role once governance is accounted for. This may reflect the fact that corruption is embedded within broader governance structures and may not be easily separable from them.

Alternatively, the weak effect may arise from measurement issues. Corruption indicators often capture perceptions rather than actual behavior and may overlap conceptually with governance measures [4]. As a result, the estimated effect of corruption may be attenuated in the presence of comprehensive governance controls.

5.4. IMPLICATIONS FOR INSTITUTIONAL REFORM

The findings have important implications for policy. They suggest that governance reforms should not be treated as uniform improvements but need to be tailored to different institutional domains.

In Vietnam, reforms aimed at improving the business environment appear to have been effective in reducing informality among firms. However, similar progress has not been achieved in reducing informal payments in public service delivery.

This implies that future reforms should focus more explicitly on addressing petty corruption in frontline services, strengthening accountability mechanisms, and improving the quality of citizen–state interactions.

6. CONCLUSION

This paper investigates the relationship between governance quality, corruption, and informality in Vietnam using a unique combination of firm-level and citizen-level institutional indicators. By integrating data from the PCI and PAPI at the provincial level, the analysis provides a more nuanced understanding of how governance affects informal economic behavior across different actors.

The main finding of the study is that the effect of governance on informality is not uniform. When governance is measured from the perspective of firms, improvements are associated with a reduction in informal practices. This result is consistent with standard theoretical expectations, as better regulatory quality, greater transparency, and lower administrative costs reduce the incentives for firms to operate informally. In contrast, when governance is measured from the perspective of citizens, higher governance scores are associated with higher reported informal payments. This divergence suggests that governance reforms may have had uneven effects across institutional domains.

A key implication of this finding is that governance should not be treated as a single, homogeneous construct. Firms and citizens interact with the state through different channels and face distinct institutional constraints. While reforms in Vietnam appear to have improved the business environment, they have not been equally effective in reducing informal payments in public service delivery. This duality reflects a broader pattern observed in transition economies, where market-oriented reforms often outpace improvements in administrative practices affecting citizens.

The role of corruption in this study appears to be less pronounced than expected. Once governance is controlled for, corruption does not exhibit a strong independent effect on informality. This may indicate that corruption is embedded within broader governance structures and cannot be easily disentangled from them. Alternatively, it may reflect limitations in measurement, as corruption indicators often capture perceptions rather than actual behavior.

From a policy perspective, the results suggest that continued efforts to improve the business environment are likely to yield benefits in terms of reducing informality among firms. However, these reforms need to be complemented by more targeted interventions aimed at reducing informal payments in public services. Strengthening accountability mechanisms, improving transparency at the frontline level, and enhancing citizen oversight may be critical steps in this direction.

Several limitations of the study should be acknowledged. First, the relatively short panel limits the ability to identify long-term causal relationships. Second, measurement issues related to governance and corruption indicators may affect the precision of the estimates. Future research could explore alternative identification strategies, such as quasi-experimental designs or instrumental variables, to better isolate causal effects. In addition, further work is needed to understand the mechanisms underlying the divergence between firm-based and citizen-based governance measures.

Despite these limitations, this paper provides new evidence on the complex relationship between governance and informality in a transition economy. By highlighting the asymmetric effects of governance across different actors, the study contributes to a more differentiated understanding of institutional quality and its economic consequences. The findings underscore that improving governance is not only about raising overall institutional scores, but also about ensuring that reforms translate into tangible improvements for both firms and citizens.

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